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WERE “IT” TO HAPPEN: CONTRACT CONTINUITY UNDER
EURO REGIME CHANGE
ROBERT HOCKETT*
ABSTRACT
One way or another, the European Monetary Union (“EMU”) is
apt to endure. The prospect of continuation under the precise
contours of the regime as we presently find it, however, is
anything but certain. Hence many investors and other actual or
prospective contract parties are likely to remain skittish until
matters grow clearer.
This skittishness, importantly, can itself hamper the prospect of
expeditious European recovery. Addressing particular sources of
ongoing uncertainty about EMU prospects can itself therefore aid
in the project of recovery. This Essay accordingly aims to impose
structure upon one particular, and indeed particularly complex,
source of uncertainty now damaging EMU prospects. That is the
matter of how best to defend, legally speaking, continuity of
contract in the event of some basic change in the current Euro
regime.
The hope is that sizing up and breaking down this question
into its constituent parts might accomplish at least three related
aims. One is to render the hypothetical problems raised by the
question more tractable than they would otherwise be. Another is
to facilitate the development of provisional plans of approach to
such problems in the event they should present themselves.
Finally, yet another is to afford confidence to the markets by
enabling contingency planning of the sort just suggested, thereby
lessening the likelihood of self-fulfilling ‘run’-like activity on
European debt instruments.
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Resident Consultant, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York; Fellow, The Century Foundation. Thanks to Dan
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INTRODUCTION: ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHETICAL TO KEEP IT
HYPOTHETICAL

One way or another, the European Monetary Union (“EMU”) is
apt to endure.1 The sunk costs, future stakes, and prospective price
of failure are simply too high to permit disunion to become truly
thinkable to most current members. The prospect of continuation
under the precise contours of the regime as we presently find it,
however, is anything but certain.2 Hence, many investors and
other actual or prospective contract parties are likely to remain
skittish until matters grow clearer.
This skittishness, importantly, can itself hamper the prospect of
full and expeditious European recovery. Addressing particular
sources of ongoing uncertainty about EMU prospects can itself
therefore aid in the project of recovery. In that light, I hope here to
impose a bit of structure upon one particular, and indeed
particularly complex, source of uncertainty now damaging EMU
prospects. That is the matter of how best to defend, legally
speaking, continuity of contract in the event of some basic change
in the current Euro regime.
My hope is that sizing up and breaking down this question into
its constituent parts might accomplish at least three related aims.
One is to render the hypothetical problems raised by the question
at least somewhat more tractable than they appear presently to be.
Another is to facilitate the development of provisional plans of
1 Much has been written over the past several years about the possibility,
desirability, and undesirability of partial or full EMU dissolution. In the interest
of brevity, I shall cite only my own two most recent interventions in the
discussion. See Robert Hockett, Save Europe’s Marriage with a Trial Separation,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 12, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-06-12/save-europe-s-marriage-with-a-trial-separation.html (suggesting that
a possible solution to save the eurozone might be to spend some time apart and
experiment with other currencies and central banks until all parties reach a
sufficient level of maturity to be in a relationship); Robert Hockett, Five Angry
Elephants, BENZINGA FINANCIAL NEWS (Mar. 14, 2012, 5:19 PM),
http://www.benzinga.com/general/topics/12/03/2424391/five-angryelephants (arguing that unless and until global distributive and currency
dysfunctions are addressed, Europe and the global economy at large are at great
risk of failure).
2 My own guess would be that a temporary two-tiered Euro arrangement
will prove most workable and attractive in the near future. See Hockett, Save
Europe’s Marriage with a Trial Separation, supra note 1.
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approach to such problems in the event they should ultimately
indeed present themselves. Finally, yet another is to afford
confidence to the markets by enabling contingency planning of the
sort just suggested, thereby lessening the likelihood of selffulfilling ‘run’-like activity on European debt instruments.
The project is indeed complex. It also turns out, however, to be
more or less tractable. The principal challenge is in deciding how
best to order the presentation with a view to rendering the analysis
as immediately graspable by intuition as possible. What has come
to seem best to me in this connection is to structure the
presentation principally by reference to three fundamental
‘dimensions,’ or ‘layers,’ of complexity. Additional sources of
complexity, seemingly less ‘fundamental’ even if numerous and
important, can then be folded-in in a more or less ad hoc manner at
minimal frustration to intuition.
That, then, is the plan I adopt for what follows. Section 2 lays
out the advertised ‘fundamental layers.’ Section 3 then notes
several additional layers of complexity that are less fundamental
and accordingly best dealt with in ad hoc fashion. Section 4 then
analyzes the contract continuity question across layers by reference
to several non-fanciful hypothetical situations in which contract
continuity would be implicated.
Section 5 briefly addresses an additional complexity that some
might believe to be introduced by 1997 Amendments made to the
New York General Obligations Law, to which many Eurodenominated financial contracts are subject. Section 6 then
concludes and looks forward. An Appendix reduces the analyses
of Sections 4 and 5 to readily intuited ‘flowchart’ form.
2.

LAYERS OF FUNDAMENTAL COMPLEXITY

We begin with the first two layers of fundamental complexity,
which probably deserve most attention because they are least
immediately familiar. First, there appear to be two distinct regimechange (“Regime Change”) scenarios to consider—viz., partial and
full dissolution of the EMU. Second, there appear to be two
contractual
performance-impediment
(“Performance
Impediment”) scenarios to consider—viz., those that give rise to
colorable impracticability excuses of performance on the one hand,
and those that give rise to colorable impossibility excuses of
performance on the other hand.
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These various Regime Change and Performance Impediment
scenarios are cross-cutting, precisely because they are situated on
distinct ‘dimensions.’ Each alternative upon one dimension, in
other words, can be paired with either alternative on the other
dimension.
Hence there are four possible combinations of
combined Regime Change and Performance Impediment scenarios. I’ll
assign italicized Roman numerals I and II to the Change scenarios
and italicized alphabet letters A and B to the Impediment scenarios.
Our possible combinations then will be IA, IB, IIA, and IIB.
Turning next to the third layer of fundamental complexity,
which comprises various “Venue” scenarios, as I’ll call them: this
one enters the picture in virtue of the existence of multiple
jurisdictions in which a contract action might be brought in
response to some breach stemming from Scenarios IA, IB, IIA, or
IIB.
Happily, as it turns out, this multiplicity can itself be more or
less safely reduced, like those in connection with Regime Change
and Performance Impediment, to a factor of two. For the principal
distinction that matters turns out to be that between courts of a
nation that has left the EMU, on the one hand, and all other courts
on the other hand.3 I’ll accordingly employ italicized HinduArabic numerals for tracking purposes in this case and distinguish
between what I’ll call scenarios “1” and “2” along this Venue
dimension of complexity—1 for suits brought in courts of a
particular nation that has exited the EMU, and 2 for suits brought
elsewhere.
Summing up, all of the foregoing entails that we now have
eight possible combinations of Regime Change, Performance
Impediment, and Venue scenarios to consider: IA1, IA2, IB1, IB2,
IIA1, IIA2, IIB1, and IIB2.
3.

ADDITIONAL LAYERS OF COMPLEXITY

As mentioned in the Introduction, there are, alas, several more
complexities that arise in connection with all of this. One, for
example, is occasioned by variation in respect of the new currency
3 This turns out to be so, in turn, because the courts of a nation that has left
the EMU will ignore the distinction between Impediment Scenarios A and B,
while other courts for their part will either follow courts of the former sort, or
resort to more or less identical doctrines—some version of impracticability or
impossibility doctrine—in connection with each such Impediment Scenario.
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regime—fixed?, adjustably pegged?, floating?,—that a nation
exiting the EMU might adopt.4 And these of course bear upon all
sorts of eventualities that might affect contract performance and
thus implicate our Contract Continuity problem.
But since (a) three dimensions—and thus eight combinations!—
already are plenty to track, while (b) the same dimensions suffice
more or less to accommodate the basic structure of our analysis,
and (c) the additional complexities seem a bit less ‘fundamental’ in
any event, I’ll simply fold those in where they turn out to be
salient.
Before now turning to the analysis, it might be helpful first
quickly to summarize the proverbial “bottom line.” Unfortunately
that is not easy to do in prose without quickly becoming
incomprehensible, at least prior to running through the analysis
itself. What I shall do instead, then, is simply to direct your
attention to a flowchart I append to the end, which in a compact
manner summarizes all that is about to follow.
And now off to the races.
4.

ANALYSIS ACROSS LAYERS

Please recall first that there are two Regime Change scenarios to
consider:
I. Regime Change Scenario I (Exit by One or More EMU
Members): One or more countries exits EMU. Others
remain. (EMU, in other words, persists, but has lost at least
one of its erstwhile members.)
II. Regime Change Scenario II (Dissolution): EMU dissolves
altogether.
Now begin with Regime Change Scenario I (Exit by One or More
EMU Members): How might contractual continuity come to be
implicated?
Here is what would seem a prototypical
4 A fixed exchange rate regime establishes specific relative valuations, or
narrow bands of the same, among participating currencies. Monetary authorities
are then obliged to maintain these valuations—typically by trading in foreign
currency markets so as to affect relative demand for, hence the relative prices of,
relevant currencies. An adjustable peg regime is one pursuant to which fixed
exchange rates are periodically adjusted pursuant to consensual decision-making
by relevant monetary authorities. Finally, a floating exchange rate regime simply
permits decentralized trading activity on the part of private market actors to
determine the relative values of currencies.
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hypothetical—“the Hypothetical.” I’ll lay it out by reference first
to a particular change (“the Change”) that amounts to an instance
of the Regime Change I scenario, then to a typical plaintiff (“the
Plaintiff”) and defendant (“the Defendant”), whose contractual
relation might be affected by the change.
4.1. First Hypothetical
4.1.1. The Change
Assume first that—oh, I don’t know—Greece exits the EMU. It
replaces the Euro with, say, a new or revived national currency, the
NeoDrachma (“NeoD”). It stipulates some initial NeoD/Euro
exchange rate and formally redenominates all pre-existing
contracts bearing some nexus to Greece—e.g., Greek sovereign
bonds, loans to Greek nationals, etc.—in NeoD. Call this “the
Change”. Something like this Change would seem to be requisite
to contractual continuity’s being so much as implicated under
Regime Change Scenario I.
Next, note that Greece might adopt any of several policies with
respect to the post-Change NeoD/Euro exchange rate. (So here’s
another layer of complexity, but I’m not numbering or lettering,
just folding it in so as to avoid an unwieldy number of
‘fundamental dimensions’):
First, Greece might undertake to maintain the initially
stipulated exchange rate indefinitely, effectively pegging the NeoD
to the Euro. This seems unlikely unless Greece intends that the peg
be adjustable, more on which prospect below. For adopting a
nonadjustable peg would allow Greece, at most, one devaluation
relative to the Euro—namely, the one conducted via the initially
stipulated exchange rate. And presumably a wish for sufficient
monetary policy autonomy as to permit repeated periodic deand/or revaluations would be among those considerations
prompting the Change in the first place.
A second prospect seems nearly as unlikely: That would be
Greece’s aiming to permit a free float of its currency on the foreign
exchange (“ForEx”) markets. This seems unlikely in light of the
new NeoD’s likely vulnerability, at least early on, to speculative
attack on global markets.
More likely, then, Greece will aim to operate with, third, an
adjustable peg, or fourth, a managed float on the ForEx markets.
Either policy will presumably be conducted by its central bank—
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the Bank of Greece, or “BG” (which is not to be confused with the
Australian singing group of the 1970s).
Now, if Greece maintains a nonadjustable peg—again,
unlikely—it will surely have to employ strict capital controls as
well. Some slightly more relaxed form of capital control or
regulation, variably strict depending on events in the global capital
and ForEx markets, also will presumably be necessary in
connection with an adjustable peg or a managed float. Since
adjustable peg or managed float seem more likely, per the
considerations adduced just above, it seems reasonable to conclude
that there will be at least some degree of capital control exercised
by Greece under the new regime.
In any event, which of these strategies is selected, and how
successfully it is implemented if it be something other than free
float, will certainly bear upon subsequent possible litigation, in
manners to be noted below.
4.1.2. The Plaintiff and Defendant
Next, per our Hypothetical, we’ll assume that—oh, I don’t
know—a German national is owed a contractual debt by the Greek
Treasury or by a Greek national. The contract denominates the
debt in Euro, and the German national prefers to be paid in Euro
per the terms of the original contract.
In such case, if the Greek Treasury or our Greek national has
traded in Euros for NeoD at the initially stipulated exchange rate,
if that rate has not since changed, and if the Bank of Greece retains
Euro reserves and is willing to exchange Euro for Drachma with
the Greek Treasury or Greek national for purposes of facilitating
transactions between the latter and Germans, then we need have
no contractual continuity problem. The Greek Treasury or Greek
national might simply purchase Euro from the BG with NeoD and
pay the German national in Euro. On the other hand . . .
If and only if one of the following occur, however, the Greek
Treasury or our Greek national might well encounter difficulty in
performing on the contract with Euros rather than NeoD, even if
they wish to do so. The legal significance that the difficulty carries
will ride upon which actually occurs. As for the latter, as noted
above, there seem to be two basic possibilities—two Performance
Impediment scenarios—to consider:
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4.1.2.1. Impediment Scenario A (Colorable Impracticability)
We assume that Greece has allowed the NeoD to float, either
freely or in managed fashion, or it maintains an adjustable peg
which has indeed now been adjusted. Assume either way that the
consequence is that the NeoD now is worth much less relative to
Euro than it was at the time of the Change.
We’ll assume that the Greek Treasury or Greek national may
still purchase Euro from Bank of Greece or on the ForEx market—
no capital controls sufficiently onerous as to prevent or prohibit
this—but at very high NeoD cost. This will invite—though not
guarantee, as we’ll see—invocation of the commercial impracticability
excuse of contractual performance by our Greek defendant should
the German national sue for payment in Euro, per terms of the
contract, in court—particularly in non-Greek court.5
4.1.2.2. Impediment Scenario B (Colorable Impossibility)
We shall assume that Greece maintains strict or adjustable peg,
or manages float, and to facilitate pursuit of that policy also
imposes capital controls. Controls are such, in turn, as to prevent
ready purchase of Euro with NeoD.
If such purchase is simply rendered more difficult than it
otherwise would have been, but is not rendered illegal or
otherwise literally impossible, then again we are looking at a
prospective impracticability excuse of performance, as in Impediment
Scenario A just above. If, on the other hand, capital controls are
such as actually to render purchase of Euro with NeoD illegal or
literally impossible, then this will invite—though not guarantee, as
we’ll see—invocation of impossibility excuse of contractual
performance should German national demand payment in Euro,
per terms of the contract, in court—particularly non-Greek court.6
All right. Finally, proceeding to our final dimension of
variation within the context of this Hypothetical, assume that our
German plaintiff sues our Greek defendant on the contract, seeking
payment in Euros, not NeoD. There are then two more scenarios—
Venue scenarios—to consider:
5 As we will see below, in Greek court the defendant is not likely to be found
even to be in breech if s/he pays in NeoD, though this isn’t quite certain.
6 See Hockett, Save Europe’s Marriage with a Trial Separation, supra note 1; see
also text accompanying note 2, supra.
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4.1.2.3. Venue Scenario 1 (Action Brought in Greek Court)
Let us assume that the contract action is brought in Greek
court. In this case the redenomination is likely to be fully
recognized, inasmuch as Greek courts apply Greek law.
Obligations accordingly held dischargeable in NeoD, presumably
in amounts determined by the legislated exchange rate. Court
holds that Greek defendant may pay German plaintiff in NeoD.
(Note that the difference between Impediment Scenarios A and B is
accordingly irrelevant here. Combinations IA1 and IB1 effectively
collapse into one.)
Presumably, however, plaintiff now will hope to appeal to
some higher court within Greek, EU, or global legal systems,
perhaps challenging the legislation itself on constitutional or
cognate treaty grounds insofar as it impairs preexisting contractual
obligations. (More on this prospect later.)
4.1.2.4. Venue Scenario 2 (Action Brought in Non-Greek Court)
Now we assume that the contract action is brought in a nonGreek—e.g., a New York court. In this case the court will embark
upon a multi-step analysis:
4.1.2.4.1. Lex Monetae
First, analysis will commence with an attempt to determine the
lex monetae—the law of the sovereign that issues the currency
named in the contract. The reason for this is that that law, per the
state theory of money that all nations (including the United States)
appear to uphold, will determine what counts as tender in discharge
of an obligation denominated in the currency issued by that
sovereign. And this is so notwithstanding any depreciation on the
part of some newly issued currency relative to whichever currency it
replaces. It is likewise so notwithstanding any other body of law
named in the contract (i.e., any law of the contract, per ii, below). In
other words, the lex monetae, effectively implicated straightaway by
the contract’s naming a currency at all, supervenes upon any
additional lex named in the contract.
A potentially vexing question can arise here, however,
depending on whether Greece and the EU/EMU agree or disagree
on the terms of Greece’s exit from the EMU. Hence we have yet
another layer of complexity here, but again I am simply folding
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this one in to avoid an unwieldy number of ‘fundamental
dimensions’ pursuant to which I structure our analysis.
So, first, were Greece to leave the EMU pursuant to some
formal agreement upon all terms of which Greece and the
EU/EMU were in accord, the answer to the lex monetae question
would be straightforward. The Greek legislation would be given
full effect in the foreign (non-Greek) court just as in the domestic
(Greek) court. In such case we would accordingly be faced with a
situation indistinguishable from that of Venue Scenario 1, above.
The contract obligation would be dischargeable in NeoD, unless
Greek and EU/EMU law themselves were challengeable on
constitutional or international legal grounds sounding in human
rights and contract-impairment.
If, by contrast, Greece were to exit the EMU on terms not
agreed by the two authorities (Greece on the one hand, EU/EMU
on the other), then our lex monetae question would seemingly be
unanswerable. For there would appear, then to be no determinate
reply to the “which money?” question. That is because the
EU/EMU (then including Greece) was and remains the issuer of
that currency which is named in the contract, while Greece is the
issuer of that currency into which the contract now has been
putatively redenominated by Greek legislative fiat.
In other words, because “which currency?” is precisely the
question here, and because two authorities each of which has a
colorable claim to sovereignty over the question at issue would be
in disagreement, we would not be able to determine what counts
as tender by reference to the law of the country that issues the
currency.7 Hence we would move on to . . .
7 It is perhaps worth noting here that this problem seems to be simply a
straightforward entailment of that ambiguity which afflicts the concept of
‘sovereignty’ itself in the context of a ‘union’ or ‘federation’ of still putatively
‘sovereign’ states. EU and EMU members retain some degree of sovereignty, of
course, yet also cede certain classic incidents of sovereignty, in a manner not unlike
that in which U.S. states were understood to have done in the early years of the
American republic prior to the Civil War.
Conundrums stemming from disagreement between states and their union
over which party bears sovereignty over some particular subject, such as
currency, do not always lend themselves to straightforward answers in such
cases. (That is one of the reasons that eighteenth century British lawyers argued
that colonial American claims on behalf of ‘divided sovereignty’—the “King in
Parliament” being the sovereign of England, the “King in the House of Burgesses
[in the person of the Royal Governor]” being the sovereign of Virginia, etc.—
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4.1.2.4.2. Law of the Contract
Next, if there is disagreement between Greece and the EMU
over the terms of Greece’s exit, hence no determinate lex monetae,
we fall back to the so-called law of the contract, if such there be.
That is, if the contract states which law shall govern its own
interpretation and application, proceed to analyze the case under
that law. (Many financial contracts of course stipulate that the law
of the State of New York shall govern.)
If the law in question is that of Greece, then we are again back
to Venue Scenario 1, above. The foreign court will decide as the
Greek court would have done. If the law is not that of Greece, then
we proceed to iv, below, to apply the apposite jurisdiction’s
impracticability or impossibility doctrines, depending on whether
we’re faced with Impediment Scenario A or B. Finally, if the contract
does not name any particular body of law as governing—that is, if
there is no law of the contract—then we fall back to . . .
4.1.2.4.3. Conflicts of Law Analysis
If there is no determinate lex monetae per i above, and the
contract does not specify any governing body of background law—
any law of the contract—per ii above, then we apply the conflicts
rules of jurisdiction in which the court entertaining the suit sits to
determine which law governs. Once that is determined, we
proceed in accordance with ii, just above. That is, if Greek law is
found applicable, we’re back to Venue Scenario 1 above, and
otherwise we proceed to iv, below.
4.1.2.4.4. Impracticability and Impossibility Doctrine
Finally, if Greek law turns out not to be applicable law, our
Greek defendant will likely argue excuse from performance on the
contract in Euro as distinguished from NeoD, per some variant of
either the impracticability doctrine, in the case of Impediment Scenario
A, or the impossibility doctrine, in the case of Impediment Scenario B.
As it happens, impracticability and impossibility doctrines look
quite similar from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. I’ll focus on New
York law, however, because so many financial contracts name it as

constituted logical absurdities. ‘No imperium in imperio,’ the ‘unitary sovereign’
advocates cried. Maybe they were right?)
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the governing law. In effect, then, we have two scenario
combinations to consider here—IA2 and IB2.
I’ll now run through the analysis in both, still staying with our
present Hypothetical. The bottom line is that our Greek defendant
would be unlikely to prevail on an impracticability defense if faced
with Impediment Scenario A, but might do better with an
impossibility defense were s/he faced with Impediment Scenario B.
Impracticability and impossibility analyses, then, run as follows.
iv.1. Scenario IA2: Impracticability Doctrine in Non-Greek
Court Under Change Scenario I (Greek exit of EMU) and
Impediment Scenario A (dramatic depreciation of Neo D
relative to Euro):
Contractual impracticability doctrine under New York Law
follows Section 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts and
Section 2–615 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”).
Restatement Section 261 states:
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is
made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of
an event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to
render that performance is discharged, unless the language
or the circumstances indicate the contrary.8
The UCC provision is similar, though it refers by its terms to
“sellers” who are parties to “commercial” contracts.9 Captioned
“Excuse by Failure of Presupposed Conditions”, Section 2–615
requires a breaching seller who would be excused from performing
to show (1) some contingency that (2) renders performance
impracticable while (3) the nonoccurrence of the contingency was
“a basic assumption upon which the contract was made.”10

8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981). See also In re Dayton
Seaside Associates No. 2, L.P., 257 B.R. 123, 139 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting
Section 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts); In re Martin Paint Stores, 199
B.R. 258, 265, 29 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CCR) 647 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 207 B.R.
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (referencing discharge by supervening impracticability as
provided for by § 261 of the Second Restatement of Contracts).
9 Official Comment 9, however, notes that the ‘reason’ of the section could
well apply to non-commercial contracts as well. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–615 (1961).
10 N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–615 (1961).
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Under both the Restatement and UCC provisions, the event or
contingency in question must have been unforeseen, not
reasonably foreseeable, and beyond the control of the breaching
party.11 The breaching party also must not have “caused” the
event or contingency.12 It must also be the case that nothing in the
contract indicates that the breaching party assumed the risk of such
event or contingency.13 The event or contingency must also “alter
the essential nature of the agreement.”14
Much of this language is of course a bit on the less-thanaltogether-helpful side. What sorts of impracticability-causing
event or contingency would be “unforeseeable,” would “alter the
essential nature of the agreement,” would be “basically” assumed
in the contract not to occur, and not be a risk “assumed” by the
party seeking excuse are not immediately obvious on the basis of
these words and phrases alone. Hence much rides upon how
courts interpret and apply the operative terms in the specific
factual contexts of particular cases.
In that light, three observations seem most important for our
purpose (which I take, per our conversation, to be preservation of
contractual continuity).
First, increased cost of performance, standing alone, does not
ordinarily serve as a basis for the impracticability excuse.15 Rather,
11 See, e.g., Cliffstar Corp. v. Riverbend Products, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 81, 84–85
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing the standard set forth by Section 2–615 of the Second
Restatement of Contracts as consisting of several questions, including whether the
event causing the breach of a contract was foreseeable at the time the contract was
made and whether such event was due to factors beyond the breaching party’s
control).
12 Id.; see also Allen v. City of Yonkers, 803 F. Supp. 679, 709–710 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (“The party asserting a defense of impracticability has the burden of
demonstrating that the event . . . made performance impracticable and that event
was not the result of that party’s actions or inactions.”).
13 See, e.g., Dayton Seaside Associates, 257 B.R. at 139 (analyzing the
“assumption of risk” in the context of Section 2–615 of the Second Restatement of
Contracts in New York).
14 See, e.g., Asphalt Intern., Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corp., S.A., 667 F.2d
261, 266 (2d Cir. 1981) (asserting a party’s excusal to perform a contractual duty
on the grounds of commercial impracticability hinges on several factors including
whether the intervening event “altered the essential nature of the charter party
agreement”).
15 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2–615 (1961) comment 4; see also Canusa Corp. v. A & R
Lobosco, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 723, 731 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (elaborating that Section 2–
615 of the Second Restatement of Contracts does not excuse a party’s duty to
perform on account of increased costs incurred by such performance).
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the increased cost must stem from an unforeseen, unforeseeable,
risk-unassumed contingency that alters the “essential nature” of
the performance.16
Where, as per our Hypothetical, the
performance in question is simply to pay Euros, the Change that
sets our case in motion would not seem to affect any “essential
nature” thereof. Perhaps an end to the Euro altogether, per Regime
Change Scenario II, considered below, would be otherwise. But
even there, it seems doubtful, as we shall see.
Second, there have, of course, been multiple occasions in the
past upon which currencies have been changed—during the
American Civil War; in the aftermath of the First World War and
the Russian Revolution, during the 1930s; in the aftermath of the
Second World War; and following the breakup of the former Soviet
Union and Soviet bloc.17 Unsurprisingly, each of these events
occasioned litigation sounding in contract and predicated on
breaches that defendants sought to excuse by reference to
impracticability.18 In virtually no such cases, including cases in
which a new currency was considerably (if not indeed
dramatically) less valuable than that which it replaced, have
American courts excused performance.19
16 See Canusa Corp., 986 F. Supp. at 731 n.6; see also Moyer v. City of Little
Falls, 510 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814–15 (Sup. 1986) (finding excusal of performance of
contractual duty was justified due to an unforeseeable factor outside of breaching
party’s control); American Trad. & Production Corp. v. Shell Int. Marine Ltd., 343
F. Supp. 91, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussing the commercial impracticability
standard set forth in the Second Restatement of Contracts and in the Uniform
Commercial Code).
17 See Niall Lenihan, The Legal Implications of the European Monetary Union
under U.S. and New York Law, at xlv through lxxvii (European Commission
Economic Paper No. 126, 1998), available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_
finance/publications/publication11220_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2012)
(providing an impressively exhaustive discussion of the many cases referenced
here).
18 See id.
19 All such cases but one concerned the Confederate dollar, while the other
case involved a long-term contract with price explicitly determined by reference
to an index that turned out seriously to underestimate inflation. See Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70–78 (W.D. Pa. 1980). It
perhaps bears noting, however, that these were all cases in which lex monetae
supported plaintiffs as distinguished from the Scenario here under consideration,
in which lex monetae is unhelpful owing to disagreement between Greece and the
EU/EMU over the terms of Greece’s exit. The distinction does not seem to me to
make a difference, but perhaps it could be seized upon by a creative defendant’s
lawyer.
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Third, and perhaps most importantly of all, New York courts
do not appear as of yet to have applied the doctrine of
impracticability outside the context of sale-of-goods contracts
governed by Article II of the UCC. In all other circumstances,
notwithstanding UCC Sec. 2–615 comment 9 cited supra, note 9,
performances that are not impossible, even if impracticable, must
be performed, else damages be paid.20 This takes us to . . .
iv.2. Scenario IB2: Impossibility Doctrine in Non-Greek
Court Under Change Scenario I (Greek exit of EMU) and
Impediment Scenario A (depreciation of NeoD relative to
Euro):
Contractual impossibility doctrine under New York Law is a
common law doctrine, by and large identical to impossibility
doctrine under the laws of other U.S. states as well as those of
other nations whose legal systems partake of the British common
law tradition.
Impossibility excuses a party’s performance under a contract in
only a very narrowly circumscribed set of circumstances—
circumstances that are but rarely found by New York courts to
obtain.21 An Act of God—or, next best thing, of government—must
intervene in such a way as to render performance either literally

It also probably bears noting that some esteemed authorities of the past have
argued that collapse of a currency—as one could, I suppose, imagine happening
to the NeoD—might under some circumstances warrant a finding of
impracticability even if courts thus far have declined so to find. See, e.g., ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1360 (1962); Evsey S. Rashba, Debts in
Collapsed Foreign Currencies, 54 YALE L. J. 1, 18–30 (1944). Lenihan, for his part
begs to differ with Corbin and Rashba. See Lenihan supra note 17, at xcviii–xcix.
My colleague Bob Hillman (a New York contract law authority), on the other
hand, seems somewhat more sympathetic to the Corbin line. I’ll soon consult
with another colleague, Bob Summers (of White & Summers) on the UCC, to get
his take as well.
20 See GLEN BANKS, NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW Sec. 20:12 (2006) on this point.
Expected performance will be excused where contingencies frustrate a party’s
ability to obtain supplies to execute a contract. Also, where delay or failure of
performance results from governmental regulation.
21 See, e.g., Lagarenne v. Ingber, 710 N.Y.S.2d 425 (3d Dep’t 2000) (holding
that for performance to be excused on grounds of impossibility, the impossibility
must be occasioned by an unanticipated event, which results in the destruction of
the subject matter or means of performance such that performance becomes
objectively impossible).
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impossible—typically through destruction of the subject matter of
the contract—or literally illegal.22
As with impracticability, discussed above, so with
impossibility, then, economic hardship alone does not count.23 Not
even bankruptcy does.24 Impossibility really means impossibility—
or illegality.
For impossibility to be found, it must also be the case that the
contract has not expressly allocated to either party the risk of that
event which has putatively rendered performance impossible.25
Relatedly, the event must not have been foreseeable to the party
invoking the doctrine.26 Nor can the impossibility in question be
idiosyncratic to the party invoking it—rather, it must be ‘objective,’
such that no other party, either, would have been capable of
rendering performance after the event in question occurred.27
As noted above, performance can be counted impossible if
rendered illegal by law.28 But the law in question must of course
22 See, e.g., Bank of New York v. Tri Polyta Finance B.V., No.
01Civ.9104(LTS)(DFE), 2003 WL 1960587 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003) (rejecting
defendants’ allegation that the economic collapse in Asia and Indonesia had
rendered their performance of a contract with the plaintiff impossible, and
holding that lack of funds, “even to the extent of insolvency or bankruptcy,” can
never excuse contractual performance). In re Regency Holdings (Cayman), Inc.,
No. 00 CV 8115(HB), 2001 WL 1033429 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001).
23 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.,
86 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating the “absolutely clear” rule
followed in New York that financial hardship allegedly caused by governmental
policy does not excuse a party from the performance of its contractual
obligations).
24 See, e.g., Barclays Business Credit, Inc., v. Inter Urban Broadcasting of
Cincinnati, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 2272 (MJL), 1991 WL 258751 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1991).
25 See, e.g., United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc.,
508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the impossibility doctrine comes into
play if a contract fails to allocate the risk of an intervening occurrence to either
party).
26 See, e.g., Inter-Power of New York, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.,
617 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563–5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (stating that a plaintiff has no claim
for impossibility who had notice of an intervening event and could have provided
for that event in the contract).
27 See, e.g., Beagle v. Parillo, 498 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178–79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
(concluding that inability of performance is not a defense if inability is personal to
the performer and not inherent in the task); United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360
F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966) (emphasizing that inability to perform is an objective,
not a subjective, standard).
28 See, e.g., Millgard Corp. v. E.E. Cruz/Nab/Fronier-Kemper, No. 99 Civ.
2952(LBS), 2004 WL 1900359, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. August 24, 2004) (declaring that
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have been promulgated after the contract was agreed to29 and
generally must not have been foreseen by or foreseeable to the
party invoking impossibility on the new law’s basis.30
And again, mere hardship worked by the law does not suffice;
the law must literally render illegal (“objectively impossible”) the
performance that would be excused.31 Nor will merely temporary
illegality warrant a finding of impossibility—the illegality in
question must be of indefinite duration.32
Bringing these considerations to bear upon the circumstances
laid out per Impediment Scenario B, we can see that an impossibility
defense by our Greek defendant might be possible. Whether it
would be would depend on the nature of the capital controls
imposed by the Greek government per that Scenario.
Were Greece, for example, to prohibit purchase of foreign
exchange—including now Euro—by Greek nationals altogether,
we would seem to have a textbook case of Act of God [government]wrought impossibility. All then would ride upon whether the
contract provided for this particular risk, or if not, then whether
the risk was in any event reasonably foreseeable by the party
invoking impossibility—our Greek defendant.
Were the answer in both cases negative, then our German
plaintiff would likely have to challenge the Greek legislation itself,
on some constitutional or treaty-based theory of contract

contract performance is impossible if it would violate city law); see also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 457 (1932).
29 See, e.g., Scanlan v. Devon Systems, Inc., No. 89 CIV 1634 LMM, 2000 WL
218389, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2000) (mentioning that the impossibility doctrine is
triggered when a previously legal agreement becomes illegal).
30 See, e.g., Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp. v. Evergreen Media Corp., 641
N.Y.S.2d 267, 269 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (noting that change of law rendering
contract performance impossible must have been unforeseen by invoking party);
Montgomery-Otsego-Schoharie Solid Waste Management Authority v. County of
Otsego, 671 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546–48 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (observing that
impossibility defense is unavailable when the change in law rendering contract
performance impossible was foreseeable).
31 See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd.,
86 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that financial difficulty even to the
point of insolvency does not meet the standard for an impossibility defense, even
where caused by governmental policy).
32 See, e.g., Scanlan 2000 WL 218389, at *2 (declaring that where impossibility
of performance is only temporary, impossibility suspends performance but does
not remove it entirely).
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impairment, rather than our Greek defendant. In essence, we
would be back to Venue Scenario 1, above.
If, on the other hand, Greece under the new regime employed
some less onerous form of capital controls, rendering the purchase
of Euro by our defendant more difficult and more expensive but
not literally illegal or impossible, the story would be different. Our
Greek defendant would remain liable on the contract and
performance would not be excused. Again, then, all now will ride
on that proverbial ‘devil’ who resides in the ‘details’—the Greek
legislation that institutes what we’ve been calling the Change.
And that closes discussion of the four possible scenario
combinations—IA1, IA2, IB1, IB2—under Regime Change Scenario I,
in which one or more nations leave the EMU, with the EMU
nevertheless continuing. Time now has come to consider a
dissolution of the EMU altogether. That is Regime Change Scenario
II.
Analysis under Regime Change Scenario II, as we shall see, is
considerably simpler than that under Regime Change Scenario I.
First, how might contractual continuity come to be implicated?
Here is what would seem the prototypical Hypothetical. I’ll
again lay things out by reference to a change, then a plaintiff and
defendant whose contractual relation is affected by the change. I’ll
keep things as close to our first Hypothetical as possible in order to
facilitate focus on the one variation introduced here—variation in
the precise form of the Regime Change that occurs.
4.2. Second Hypothetical
4.2.1. The Change
Let us assume first that the EMU simply dissolves, by mutual
agreement of all parties presently party to that Union. Assume
that Greece replaces the Euro with, say, a new national currency,
the NeoD. It stipulates some NeoD/Euro exchange rate and
formally redenominates all pre-existing contracts bearing some
nexus to Greece—e.g., Greek sovereign bonds, loans to Greek
nationals, etc.—in NeoD. Call this “the Change.” Something like
this Change would seem to be requisite to contractual continuity’s
being so much as implicated under Regime Change Scenario II.
Next, note that, in contrast to the story in Regime Change
Scenario 1, in this scenario, Greece probably need not adopt any
particular policy with respect to the post-Change NeoD/Euro
exchange rate, for the Euro will simply cease to exist. The one
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possible exception would be the circumstance in which the terms
of the EMU’s dissolution were such as to ‘phase out’ the Euro over
some period, analogously to the way in which the Euro was
‘phased in’ in the first instance.
Were that to occur, analysis here during the phase-out would
be more or less identical to that under Regime Change Scenario I,
above. I shall therefore incorporate that analysis by reference here
for any phase-out period. Then, once we’re past any phase-out
period, we have the following.
Greece will presumably adopt some policy concerning the
NeoD’s relation to other currencies in the world, even if not, under
this scenario, to the now non-existent Euro. There are of course
several possibilities.
First, Greece might undertake to peg the NeoD to some other
currency—say, oh, I don’t know—a NeuDeutscheMark—to keep it
credible. This seems unlikely unless Greece intends that the peg be
adjustable, more on which prospect below. For adopting a
nonadjustable peg would deny Greece sufficient monetary policy
autonomy as to permit repeated periodic de- and/or revaluations,
which would presumably be among those considerations
prompting the Change here in the first place.
A second prospect seems nearly as unlikely. That would be
Greece’s aiming to permit a free float of its currency on the ForEx
markets. This seems unlikely in light of the new NeoD’s likely
vulnerability, at least early on, to speculative attack on the ForEx
markets.
More likely, then, Greece will aim to operate with either third,
an adjustable peg, or fourth, a managed float on the ForEx markets.
Either policy will presumably be conducted by its central bank—
the Bank of Greece, or “BG” (which is still not to be confused with
the Australian singing group of the 1970s).
Now, if Greece maintains a non-adjustable peg—again,
unlikely—it will surely have to employ capital controls as well.
Some form of capital control or regulation, albeit variably strict
depending on events in the global capital and ForEx markets, also
will presumably be necessary in connection with an adjustable peg
or a managed float.
Which of these strategies is selected, and how successfully it is
implemented if it be something other than free float, will bear upon
subsequent litigation in manners to be noted below.
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4.2.2. The Plaintiff and Defendant
Next, per our Hypothetical, we’ll assume that—oh, I don’t
know—a German national is owed a contractual debt by the Greek
Treasury or a Greek national. The contract denominates the debt
in Euro, and the German national understands that this is no
longer possible. Our plaintiff might nevertheless come to be
aggrieved, in a manner that implicates law, under various
conceivable circumstances.
If one of the following occurs, the Greek Treasury or our Greek
national might well encounter difficulty in performing on the
contract in a manner satisfactory to the German plaintiff, even if
they wish to do so; the legal significance that the difficulty carries
depends on which one actually occurs.
4.2.2.1. Impediment Scenario A (Colorable Lex Monetae or
Impracticability Defense)
We assume Greece has allowed the NeoD to float, either freely
or in managed fashion, or it maintains an adjustable peg which has
indeed now been adjusted.
Assume either way that the
consequence is that NeoD now is worth much less relative to Euro
than it was at the time of the Change. In other words, its value is
now much vitiated by effective inflation of the NeoD itself.
Our German plaintiff, however, insists on payment at the
original NeoD/Euro exchange rate at the time of the Change, with
the current ‘shadow Euro’ value determined by, say, reference to a
weighted average of the values of all other erstwhile Eurocurrencies. This will invite invocation of the lex monetae doctrine,
as well, perhaps, of the commercial impracticability excuse of
contractual performance by our Greek defendant should the
German plaintiff demand payment at the original exchange rate in
non-Greek court.
4.2.2.2. Impediment Scenario B (Colorable Impossibility Defense)
We shall assume that Greece maintains a strict or adjustable
peg, or manages a float, and to facilitate pursuit of that policy also
imposes capital controls. The controls are such, in turn, as to
prevent ready payment of foreign nationals with NeoD. If such
payment is simply rendered more difficult than it otherwise would
have been, but is not rendered illegal or otherwise literally
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impossible, then again we are looking at prospective lex monetae or
impracticability excuse of performance, as in Impediment Scenario A.
If, on the other hand, capital controls are such as actually to
render payment with NeoD illegal or impossible, then this will
invite invocation of impossibility excuse of contractual performance
should German national demand payment in NeoD, per
legislatively redenominated terms of the contract, in non-Greek
court. Finally, our German plaintiff sues our Greek defendant on
the contract, seeking payment in NeoD at the original exchange
rate. There are then two more sub-scenarios to consider.
4.2.2.3. Venue Scenario 1 (Action Brought in Greek Court)
Assume that the contract action is brought in Greek (domestic)
court. In this case the redenomination is again going to be
recognized, inasmuch as Greek courts apply Greek law. The only
question will be whether the defendant may depart from the
originally legislated exchange rate, which in turn will depend on
what the legislation itself has to say here. If the legislation
stipulates that the original exchange rate remains applicable
(which seems unlikely if Greek government aims to maintain
adjustability of currency relative to others), and defendant
encounters difficulty paying in consequence, then analysis will
proceed along lines sketched in Venue Scenario 2, below.
If, on the other hand, legislation provides for payment in
NeoD, period, with no reference to any particular relative value
thereof, then defendant will prevail under lex monetae.
Presumably, however, plaintiff will now aim to appeal to some
higher court within Greek, EU or global legal systems, perhaps
challenging the legislation itself on constitutional or cognate treaty
grounds insofar as it impairs preexisting contractual obligations. It
would seem, however, that plaintiff will not likely prevail in such
case, in view of the weight all nations appear to place upon lex
monetae.
4.2.2.4. Venue Scenario 2 (Action brought in Non-Greek Court)
Now assume that the contract action is brought in non-Greek
(foreign), e.g., New York court: now the court will embark upon a
multi-step analysis. First it will determine the lex monetae—the law
of the sovereign that issues the currency named in the contract.
For that law, again under the state theory of money that all nations
(including the United States) appear to uphold, determines what
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counts as tender in discharge of an obligation denominated in the
currency issued by that sovereign. And this is so notwithstanding
any depreciation on the part of some newly issued currency
relative to whatever currency it replaces and notwithstanding any
other body of law named in the contract (i.e., any law of the contract,
per v, below).
The only question, then, would be how inflation, per our
Hypothetical, would affect defendant’s obligation, and this in turn
would ride, as in Venue Scenario 1 just above, on what the Greek
legislation itself had to say about the matter. If the Greek
legislation said nothing about retention of an initial exchange rate
for redenomination purposes, plaintiff would again be out of luck,
as envisaged in 1, just above. The only recourse then would be
constitutional-like challenge to the legislation itself.
On the other hand, if the Greek legislation did provide for
revaluation of redenominated sums in a manner that continued to
reflect the initial exchange rate stipulated in the legislation, then
defendant would wish to appeal to impracticability or
impossibility doctrine as discussed above. That would raise the
question of which jurisdiction’s such doctrine was applicable.
Hence we would turn to . . .
4.2.2.4.1. Law of the Contract
First we determine the so-called law of the contract, if such there
be. That is, if the contract states which law shall govern its own
interpretation and application, we proceed to analyze the
impracticability or impossibility question under that law. (Many
financial contracts of course stipulate that the law of the State of
New York shall govern.)
If the law in question is that of Greece, then we are again back
to Venue Scenario 1, above. If the law is not that of Greece, then we
proceed to vii, below, to apply the apposite jurisdiction’s
impracticability or impossibility doctrines, depending on whether
we’re faced with Impediment Scenario A or B. Finally, if the contract
does not name any particular body of law as governing—that is, if
there is no law of the contract—then we fall back to . . .
4.2.2.4.2. Conflicts of Law Analysis
If there is no governing body of background law per v above,
then apply the conflicts rules of jurisdiction in which the court
entertaining the suit sits to determine which law governs. Once
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that is determined, proceed in accordance with v, above. That is, if
Greek law is found applicable, we’re back to 1 above, and
otherwise we proceed to vii, below.
4.2.2.4.3. Impracticability or Impossibility Defenses
Finally, if Greek law turns out not to be applicable law apart
from defining the currency, and that law in turn, per its
redenomination provision, appears to suggest that redenomination
occurs strictly in keeping with the first-stated exchange rate
between the new NeoD and the old Euro, and the NeoD in the
meanwhile has significantly dropped in value, our Greek
defendant might argue excuse from performance per some variant
of either the impracticability doctrine, in the case of Impediment
Scenario A, or the impossibility doctrine, in the case of Impediment
Scenario B. Analysis will then proceed as laid out above in
connection with each doctrine.
5.

A SPECIAL CASE? THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW

Ah, but wait. What about the 1997 Amendments to the New
York General Obligations Law? As the reader likely knows, New
York amended its general obligations law in 1997 to ensure
continuity of contract after the Euro, pursuant to the EMU’s
coming into being, replaced the European Currency Unit
(“ECU”).33 That was an important measure to take, because many
contracts—particularly derivative and other financial contracts—
are either entered into in the State of New York, name New York
law as the law of the contract, or both.
In essence, the 1997 Amendments provide that if a subject or
medium of payment of a contract, security, or financial instrument
is the pre-Euro ECU, the Euro will count as a commercially
reasonable substitute and substantial equivalent.
The Euro
accordingly may be used to determine the value of the ECU at the
time of payment, or may be tendered, at an exchange rate specified
in or calculable in accordance with regulations adopted by the
Council of the European Union.

33 See S. Memo. In Supp 220–5049, Reg. Sess., at 2299 (N.Y. 1997) (codified at
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5–1601–1604 (McKinney 1999)) (detailing New York
law guaranteeing continuity of contract following the replacement of the ECU
with the Euro).
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None of this would seem to change the analysis provided
above. There are two reasons for this. The first, narrower reason is
that the amendment to the General Obligations law refers by terms
to contracts denominated in ECU, providing in essence that the
Euro now is, for all commercially practical intents and purposes,
the ECU. It says nothing about, nor does it appear in any way to
contemplate, any prospective retreat from the Euro (or ECU) to
distinct national currencies.
The second, broader reason is that the amendment to the
General Obligations law appears to have been meant simply to
codify and make plain in one place something that already would
have been legally true—namely, that per the lex monetae of the
EMU, which New York and all other jurisdictions already would
have accepted per the state theory of money that predominates across
the world, the ECU has now been officially replaced by the Euro.
The amendment accordingly added nothing of substance, but
merely declared in an up-front, statutory fashion what was already
true as a matter of common law.
6.

CONCLUSION: KEEPING IT UNREAL

I hope I have managed to render more tractable that complex,
multilayered problem that could be occasioned by what has
become, alas, more than a mere abstract possibility.34 While I do
not believe fundamental EMU regime change to be likely—
desirable as I believe at least one temporary change to that regime
would be—I do think it helpful to think through in advance what
legal consequences would be apt to follow were such change to
occur.
Contingency planning of this sort not only assures more
orderly, less panicked responses in the event that the contemplated
eventuality does occur; it also, in forestalling panic, actually lessens
the likelihood of the eventuality itself. For as we know well from
hundreds of years of financial history, financial and money
markets are one realm in which prophecies, dire or exuberant, are
apt to prove self-fulfilling.

34 The reader is hereby reminded that the Appendix immediately following
reduces all of the analysis to a conveniently tractable ‘flowchart’ form.
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APPENDIX: FLOW CHART SUMMARY
(Read Top to Bottom, then Left to Right)

Regime Change I: Exit by One or More Economic and Monetary
Union Members (“EMU”)—Country Greece.
Hypothetical: Contract in Euros, Non-Greek Party Prefers
Payment in Euros.
Impediment A: New Greek Currency
depreciates.
Greek Defendant pays in new Greek
currency.
Venue 1: Suit in
Venue 2: Suit in
Greek Court.
NY Court.
Defendant
Seek Lex Monetae.
Prevails.35
If Greece/EMU
split amicably, Lex
Monetae is Greek.
And…
If Greek, Defendant
prevails.
If split is not
amicable, There’s
no Lex Monetae.
If no Lex Monetae,
seek Law of
Contract:
If Greek, Defendant
prevails.
If not Greek, go to
bottom line.
If no Law of
Contract,
Conflicts Analysis.
If Greek, Defendant
prevails:
If not Greek,
Bottom Line:
Defendant loses:
Impracticability
Claim.

Impediment B: Cap Controls Prevent
Euro Purchase.
Greek Defendant unable to pay in Euro.
Venue 1: Suit in
Greek Court.
Defendant
prevails.

Venue 2: Suit in NY
Court.
Seek Lex Monetae.
If Greece/EMU split
amicably, Lex
Monetae is Greek.
And…
If Greek, Defendant
prevails.
If split is not
amicable, no Lex
Monetae.
If no Lex Monetae,
seek Law of
Contract
If Greek, Defendant
prevails.
If not Greek, to
bottom line.
If no Law of
Contract,
Conflicts Analysis.
If Greek, Defendant
prevails:
If not Greek,
Defendant wins:
Impossibility
Claim.

Note that at any point herein at which Greece prevails, the plaintiff
may nonetheless challenge new Greek legislation itself on constitutional
or treaty-based grounds for impairment of contract. That might be
difficult in view of lex monetae, but . . . .
35
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Regime Change II: Dissolution of Economic and Monetary Union
Hypothetical: Contract in Euros, Non-Greek Party Prefers
Payment in Greek Currency at Initial Exchange Rates.
Impediment A: New Greek Currency
depreciates:
Greek Defendant prefers payment at
current rate.
Venue 1: Suit in
Venue 2: Suit in NY
Greek Court.
Court.
If Greek
Seek Lex Monetae;
Legislation Does
not Guarantee
Exchange Rate:
Lex Monetae is
Defendant
Greek.
prevails.36
If Greek
Hence Venue 1
Legislation
analysis.

Guarantees
Exchange Rate
Employ
Impracticability
Analysis per
above.

Impediment B: Cap Controls Prevent
Payout:
Greek Defendant is unable to pay at
all.
Venue 1: Suit
Venue 2: Suit in NY
in Greek Court. Court.
Defendant
Seek Lex Monetae:
prevails.

Lex Monetae is
Greek.
Defendant prevails.

Note again that at any point herein at which Greece prevails, the
plaintiff may nonetheless challenge new Greek legislation itself on
constitutional or treaty-based grounds for impairment of contract. That
might be difficult in view of lex monetae, but . . . .
36
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